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1 Introduction
New Keynesian models with labor market frictions have been extensively used for optimal
monetary policy analysis.1 Deviations from Walrasian wage setting a¤ect ination through
the real marginal costs and thus the monetary transmission mechanism (see Walsh, 2005;
Krause and Lubik, 2007a; and Krause et al., 2008). Papers inspecting optimal monetary
policy in a search-and-matching model usually assume that hours per worker are constant
and a rm is composed of a single worker, so he contributes to the rms prot through its
marginal productivity. In this paper, we characterize optimal policy in a large-rm setup
with two margins of labor, namely employment and hours per employee. Two related forces
a¤ecting wages come up in this realistic framework. First, a rm can hire multiple workers
and an additional worker is not productive straight away. Therefore, he contributes to prots
by a¤ecting the wage of all other workers, which results in a wage externality. Second, a
rm can adjust the two labor margins, which sheds light on the wage curve, i.e. the real
wage is a function of the number of hours worked. A form of real wage rigidityemerge 
when wages respond little to hours due to imperfect competition and labor market frictions.
Unlike the typical search-and-matching model, rms can exploit it by overusing the hours
margin when adjusting production. We argue that deviation from price stability might occur
in this setup. With its lever on ination and real marginal costs, the Ramsey planner can
a¤ect the real wage and thus the rms hours decision.
Once we allow for rms to have many workers, we move away from the standard one-
worker-rm model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and towards a large-rm model. Many
studies considering labor market frictions in monetary economies focus on one of two labor
input margins, either the extensive margin (employment) or the intensive margin (hours).
Ohanian and Ra¤o (2012), however, stress the importance of accounting for both the ex-
tensive and the intensive labor input margin. In our model, employment is predetermined,
1See Thomas (2008), Faia (2009), Blanchard and Galí (2010), Ravenna and Walsh (2012), for instance.
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i.e. it takes one period for a newly hired worker to become productive. When faced with a
shock, rms cannot expand the extensive margin of labor on impact, but instead adjust hours
in a right-to-managefashion. We believe that predetermined employment is a reasonable
assumption since VAR evidence suggests that, on impact, employment and unemployment
respond little (if at all) to demand shocks (see Monacelli et al., 2010, Brueckner and Pappa,
2012).
The right-to-manage feature by which rms choose hours worked unilaterally, coupled
with wage bargaining, results in a wage curve, i.e. the real wage becomes a function of the
number of hours worked. Kuester (2010) shows that a model with such a wage channel
performs well at matching impulse responses in US data. In the presence of the wage
curve, instantaneous hiring vs. predetermined employment is not an innocuous model choice.
With instantaneous hiring as in Sunakawa (2013), the marginal worker generates prots by
contributing directly to production. With predetermined employment, an additional worker
contributes to current prots by reducing the wage payments to all existing workers, creating
a wage externality. An additional worker reduces the number of hours needed to satisfy
future demand as rms shift production from the intensive to the extensive labor margin.
Through the wage curve, the reduction in hours results in a reduction in the real wage.
We assume that producers are monopolistically competitive rms that face price rigidities
as well as search-and-matching frictions in the labor market (see Barnichon, 2010, Kuester,
2010 and Thomas, 2011). Ebell and Haefke (2009) justify the large-rm assumption under
monopolistic competition by arguing that a rms size is related to its market power. While
the separation of these two frictions in a producer-retailer structure, as in Trigari (2006), is
a useful device for many research questions, we argue that optimal policy prescriptions are
rather sensitive to this assumption.
Our contribution is to show that our large-rm model combining the two labor margins
gives rise to optimal monetary and scal policies. We highlight that both the intensive
3
and the extensive labor margins are distorted in the competitive allocation. Hours per
employee are ine¢ ciently low because of the combination of imperfect competition in product
markets and labor market frictions (wage bargaining coupled with a right-to-managechoice
of hours). Hiring is ine¢ cient for two reasons. All things equal, the wage externality implies
that rms tend to over-hire in order to benet from the reduction in wages (see Stole and
Zwiebel, 1996). This e¤ect is, however, dominated by the fact that each employee works
too few hours, implying that the steady-state value of an additional worker is lower than
is e¢ cient. As a result, both hours and employment are suboptimally low at the steady
state. We show how a combination of a tax on rm revenues, a consumption subsidy and
a compensating transfer to unemployed home production workers makes the steady state
e¢ cient. Under an optimal tax policy mix, uctuations in real marginal costs due to price
setting frictions represent the only cyclical distortions. Therefore, strict ination targeting
is optimal and implements the e¢ cient allocation. However, when tax instruments are
unavailable and the steady state is distorted, the Ramsey optimal policy deviates from price
stability.
Labor inputs distortions at the steady state result in ine¢ cient cyclical uctuations in
response to shocks. The wage per worker, set through bilateral bargaining, is an increasing
and convex function of hours worked, as captured by the wage curve. The slope of the
wage curve (i.e. the real marginal wage) is too low at the steady state due to the hours
distortion described above. This implies that, in response to shocks, wages do not rise much
for a given increase in hours worked. Firms exploit this endogenous real wage rigidity
by overusing the hours margin, and potentially underusing the employment margin, when
responding to changes in demand or technology. Price rigidities give the Ramsey planner a
tool to inuence the real marginal wage and thus the tradeo¤ between the intensive and the
extensive labor margin. Ination is used as a countercyclical policy instrument (with respect
to hours worked) to dampen ine¢ cient uctuations in hours. We show that the magnitude
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of the deviation of price stability depends on the size of the hours distortion, which in turn
is driven by the bargaining power of workers, the disutility cost of hours and the return to
hours in production (see also Barnichon, 2012).
Several authors have analyzed the implications of labor search frictions and price rigidi-
ties for optimal policy. Ravenna and Walsh (2011) study optimal monetary policy in a
linear-quadratic framework, while Sala et al. (2008) use an ad-hoc loss function. These
authors do not distinguish between the two labor margins. Thomas (2008) shows that
imperfect wage adjustment creates ine¢ cient hiring and leads to optimal deviations from
price stability. Blanchard and Galí (2010) study the e¤ect of real wage rigidities on the
ination-unemployment trade-o¤. However, they all restrict their attention to the case of
an e¢ cient steady state. Faia (2009) shows that deviations from the e¢ cient steady state,
through the Hosios condition, imply that optimal monetary policy does not fully stabilize
prices. Sunakawa (2013) extends this analysis by assuming that hours are chosen in a right-
to-manage fashion. Importantly, unlike that author, employment is predetermined in our
model. Finally, Ravenna and Walsh (2012) characterize optimal tax policies in a model
where price rigidities and labor search frictions a¤ect di¤erent sectors. We provide policy
recommendations in a setting where rms, with two labor input margins, face both labor
search frictions and price adjustment costs. Another strand of the literature has explored
various aspects of the large-rm setup, but has so far not provided an optimal monetary
policy analysis.2 Our paper aims to ll this gap.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 describes the distortions at the steady state and the optimal taxation results. In Section
4, we analyze optimal monetary policy. Section 5 concludes.
2Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), Cahuc et al. (2008), Mortensen (2009) have shown that a large-rm model
combined with search-matching frictions generates ine¢ ciencies in the competitive allocation. However, they
do not consider hours, such that the only labor market distortion is over-hiring by rms. Beugnot and Tidball
(2010) incorporate price setting in a large-rm model, where both hiring and pricing decisions are in the
same sector and the aggregate production function features increasing returns to scale. Here, we distinguish
between two labor margins and allow for increasing returns to hours only.
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2 Model
Our model features search-and-matching frictions in the labor market and bilateral wage
bargaining à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).3 We adopt the large-rm version of this
model where rms employ many workers, see Chapter 2 in Pissarides (2000). We allow for
variable hours per worker such that labor input can be adjusted along two margins, the
extensive margin (employment) and the intensive one (hours per employee). Firms operate
under monopolistic competition and face quadratic price adjustment costs à la Rotemberg
(1982). Labor search frictions and goods market imperfections a¤ect the same rms, as in
Barnichon (2010), Kuester (2010) and Thomas (2011).4 Employment is predetermined and
rms adjust hours unilaterally to satisfy demand in the short run, as in the right-to-manage
model of e.g. Trigari (2006).
2.1 Households
In the representative household or family, a fraction nt of members are employed in the
market economy and receive the real wage wit from each rm i for providing hours of work
hit. Each employed family member works for all rms on the unit interval. The remaining
1  nt family members are unemployed; they are instead engaged in home production. The
family maximizes lifetime utility
E0
1P
t=0
t

lnCt   nt
Z 1
0
hh
1+h
it
1 + h
di

, (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, Ct denotes consumption, h > 0 captures the weight
on hours in labor disutility, while h  0 determines the curvature of labor disutility. There
exists an insurance technology guaranteeing complete consumption risk sharing between
3The online appendix contains detailed model derivations.
4Many New Keynesian models with labor market search, e.g. Faia (2009) and Ravenna and Walsh (2012),
instead separate these two frictions in what is known as a producer-retailer structure.
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family members, such that Ct denotes consumption enjoyed by a member as well as overall
family consumption. As in Ravenna and Walsh (2012), consumption consists of nal goods
sold in the market and home-produced goods, i.e Ct = Cmt + (1  nt) b where b is the
productivity of workers in home production.
The family maximizes lifetime utility (1) subject to the sequence of budget constraints
(1 +  c)Cmt +
Bt
RtPt
= nt
1R
0
wit (hit) di+
Bt 1
Pt
+Dt + (1  nt)T b + Tt, (2)
where  c is a tax on consumption, Pt is the price level, Bt are one-period nominal bonds that
cost 1=Rt units of currency in t and pay a safe return of one currency unit in period t + 1.
Consumption expenditure Cmt and bond purchases Bt are nanced through wage income by
employed members, interest income on bond holdings, real prots Dt, lump sum transfers Tt,
and lump sum transfers to the unemployed T b. Rewriting the household budget constraint
in terms of total consumption gives
(1 +  c)Ct +
Bt
RtPt
= nt
1R
0
wit (hit) di+ (1  nt) bc + Bt 1
Pt
+Dt + Tt, (3)
where an unemployed worker produces (1 +  c) b units of market consumption goods and
receives the lump sum transfer T b, i.e. bc = (1 +  c) b + T b. So far, we have described the
representative family. Given that all families are identical in equilibrium and their mass is
normalized to unity, Ct represents household consumption as well as economy-wide consump-
tion. The rst order conditions for consumption and bonds imply 1 = RtEtft;t+1=t+1g,
where t 1;t = 
Ct 1
Ct
is the stochastic discount factor and t = Pt=Pt 1 is the gross ination
rate.
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2.2 Labor Market Search and Matching
Firms post vacancies and unemployed workers search for jobs. LetMt =M0ut v1 t denote
the number of successful matches. The matching technology is a Cobb-Douglas function of
the unemployment rate ut = 1 nt and the aggregate number of vacancies vt =
R 1
0
vitdi, where
 2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of the number of matches to unemployment andM0 > 0 is a scale
parameter. The probability of a vacancy being lled next period is qt =Mt=vt =M0 t ,
where the ratio of vacancies to unemployed workers t = vt=ut is a measure of labor market
tightness. The job nding rate is pt =Mt=ut = qtt. A constant fraction  of matches are
destroyed each period, such that
nit+1 = (1  )nit + qtvit (4)
describes the evolution of employment at rm i. Notice that current hires become productive
only in the next period, making employment predetermined.
2.3 Wage Determination
Firms bargain with each worker bilaterally over the real wage wit and split the joint surplus
according to their respective bargaining weights  and (1  ). It can be shown that the
bargaining wage satises5
wit = 

hit
'
w0it (hit) + vt

+ (1  )

hh
1+h
it
1 + h
1
t
+ bc

, (5)
where v is the per-period cost to the rm of posting a vacancy, ' is the elasticity of output to
hours (dened below) and t = 1=[(1 +  c)Ct] is the Lagrange multiplier on the household
budget constraint (2). An employed worker su¤ers the disutility hh
1+h
it =(1 + h) from
working, which we divide by t to convert utils into consumption goods. His outside option
5See the online appendix.
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is represented by bc.
The rms surplus from employing a marginal worker equals the latters contribution to
prots. As in Barnichon (2010) and Thomas (2011), a rm sets its price prior to hiring and
wage bargaining. Once it has set a price, it adjusts hours unilaterally to satisfy demand
at that price. Therefore, rm revenues are independent of nit and the contribution of the
marginal worker to rm prots is the marginal reduction in the wage bill, (hit=')w0it (hit)
with w0it (hit)  @wit@hit dening the real marginal wage, and not his marginal revenue product
as in the standard search-and-matching model. The decrease in costs due to an additional
hire - through lower average hours and lower wages paid to all workers - is what we call the
wage externalityand it is discussed in detail below.
By the method of undetermined coe¢ cients, we nd the following solution to (5),
wit (hit) = vt + (1  ) bc + {hh
1+h
it
1 + h
(1 +  c)Ct, (6)
where we dene
{  1  
1   1+h
'
. (7)
The derivative of (6) is the real marginal wage,
w0it (hit) = { mrsit. (8)
where mrst denotes the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure,
mrsit = hh
h
it (1 + 
c)Ct. (9)
We impose 1    (1 + h) =' > 0 in (7).6 This implies that { > 0, such that the real
marginal wage under bargaining (8) is positively related to hours worked. Furthermore,
6When computing the steady state numerically, we verify that this condition is satised.
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under the usual assumption that 1+h
'
> 1, we have that { > 1.7 If wages were set in a
Walrasian labor market, we would have { = 1 instead.8 The parameter { captures the
distortion imposed by the wage bargaining process. Ceteris paribus, a greater { implies that
raising hours worked results in a larger increase in the equilibrium wage. Given 1+h
'
> 1,
the slope of the wage curve is increasing in the bargaining power of workers, . For a given
bargaining power of workers , the parameter { is increasing in the curvature of the disutility
of hours worked 1 + h, and decreasing in the returns to hours in production, '. The wage
curve is steeper, the higher is the utility cost of hours (1 + h) relative to the degree of
returns to hours, '.
2.4 Production
Final output Yt is an aggregate of intermediate goods Yit bundled according to the function
Yt = (
R 1
0
Y
" 1
"
it di)
"
" 1 , where " is the elasticity of substitution between the individual goods
varieties. Given a price Pit for each variety i, the corresponding demand function is given
by Y dit = (Pit=Pt)
 " Yt.
Firms indexed by i 2 (0; 1) use labor to produce intermediate goods under monopolis-
tic competition. Output of an individual rm Yit is produced according to the following
production function,
Yit = Atnith
'
it, (10)
where At is a technology index common to all rms. The parameter 'measures the short-run
returns to hours or the elasticity of output to hours. Production is thus linear in employment
and (potentially) non-linear in hours per worker hit. The rm sets a price at the beginning
of the period and commits to satisfying demand at that price. Taking into account the rms
7We do not consider as empirically relevant the case where 1+h' < 1.
8The e¢ cient wage is derived in the online appendix.
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production technology (10), its demand constraint is

Pit
Pt
 "
Yt = Atnith
'
it. (11)
Since employment is predetermined, the rm adjusts hours worked in the short run in order
to produce the amount of output demanded. More formally, the rm chooses a price Pit,
hours worked hit, vacancies vit, and next periods employment nit+1, to maximize the present
discounted stream of future prots,
E0
1P
t=0
0;t
" 
1   f Pit
Pt
Y dit   wit (hit)nit   vvit  
p
2

Pit
Pit 1
  1
2
Yt
#
, (12)
subject to the law of motion for employment (4), the equilibrium wage (6), and the demand
constraint (11). In the objective function (12),  f is a tax on rm revenues and 0;t =
0;11;2 : : : t 1;t. Firm revenues are taxed if 
f > 0 and subsidized if  f < 0. Following
Rotemberg (1982), price changes are subject to quadratic adjustment costs scaled by the
parameter p  0. Substituting demand into the rms objective function (12), we can write
the rms optimization problem as a Lagrangian problem,
max
fhit;vit;nit+1;Pitg1t=0
E0
1P
t=0
0;tf
 
1   f Pit
Pt
1 "
Yt   wit (hit)nit   vvit   p
2

Pit
Pit 1
  1
2
Yt
  sit[

Pit
Pt
 "
Yt   Atnith'it]  'nt [nit+1   (1  )nit   qtvit]g,
where sit and 'nt are the Lagrange multipliers on the demand constraint and on the rms
employment dynamics, respectively. Since all rms choose the same price, hours, vacancies
and future employment level in equilibrium, we drop the i-subscript from here on.
Hours Worked Notice that a workers marginal product per hour, dened as mpht 
@(Yt=nt)
@ht
, is
mpht = 'Ath
' 1
t . (13)
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If ' > 1, we have short run increasing returns to hours, implying @mpht
@ht
> 0. This means
that increasing hours by 1% raises output per worker by more than 1%. As argued by Oi
(1962) and Solow (1964), increasing returns to hours can be rationalized through unobserved
variations in factor utilization, such as work intensity, or e¤ort. See also Barnichon (2010,
2012) and Galí and van Rens (2014).
The rst order condition for hours worked states that the Lagrange multiplier on the
demand constraint st equals the real marginal wage divided by the marginal product of
hours,
st =
w0t (ht)
mpht
. (14)
Equation (14) describes the rms real marginal costs, i.e. the change in the wage bill for
a unit increase in output. Since employment is predetermined, rms increase production
to satisfy demand by increasing hours worked. Using more hours has two e¤ects on real
marginal costs. On one hand, it increases the real marginal wage w0t (ht), or the cost of one
additional worker-hour, provided that { > 0 in (8), and therefore st. On the other hand,
when ' 6= 1, the marginal productivity of hours also varies with hours worked. Under the
standard assumption of decreasing returns to hours (' < 1), mpht falls with hours, raising
real marginal costs. Under increasing returns to hours (' > 1), the marginal product of
hours mpht instead rises with hours, which reduces st. Then real marginal costs respond less
positively to a rise in hours worked.
The real marginal cost can be seen as the cost of using the hours margin, rather than the
employment margin, to adjust output in response to a persistent shock. It is increasing in
the slope of the wage curve, w0t (ht), and decreasing in the marginal product of hours, mpht.
Vacancy Posting The rst order conditions for vacancies and next periods employment
together imply
v
qt
= Et

t;t+1

t+1 + (1  )
v
qt+1

, (15)
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where t is the shadow value of the marginal worker. A rm posts vacancies until the cost of
hiring a worker equals the expected discounted future benets from this extra worker. The
costs of hiring a worker are given by the vacancy posting costs, v, multiplied by the average
duration of a vacancy, 1=qt. The benets of hiring a worker are his shadow value, it, plus
the vacancy posting costs saved in case the employment relationship continues.
In the one-worker-rm framework with instantaneous hiring, the shadow value of a mar-
ginal worker, t, corresponds to his marginal productivity net of his wage. In our setup
with large rms and predetermined employment, the marginal worker reduces future hours
worked of all the rms employees by shifting production from the intensive to the exten-
sive margin. The reduction in hours in turn reduces the wage determined in the bargaining
process. Formally, the shadow value of a marginal worker captures the reduction in the wage
bill induced by an additional hire,
t =  
@wt (ht)nt
@nt
=  wt (ht) + ht
'
w0t (ht) . (16)
On one hand, hiring an additional worker costs the rm wt. On the other, it allows the rm
to reduce the number of hours, and through (6) the wage payments to, all other workers.
The degree of returns to hours has a direct and an indirect e¤ect on the shadow value.
First, if the degree of returns to hours ' is high, a given reduction in hours reduces output by
a larger amount. Then hiring an additional worker and reducing hours is less attractive and
the shadow value is lower. Second, there is an indirect e¤ect through the wage externality. If
the degree of returns to hours ' is high relative to the utility cost of hours (1+h), the wage
curve is rather at and raising hours has a smaller e¤ect on the equilibrium wage. Then the
shadow value of the marginal worker is lower and hiring is discouraged.
Substituting out the real marginal wage in (16), the shadow value can be expressed as
t =  wt (ht) +
ht
'
stmpht. (17)
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Price Setting The rst order condition for prices yields the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
pt (t   1) = "st  
 
1   f ("  1) + pEtt;t+1t+1 (t+1   1) Yt+1Yt

. (18)
Our specication of price rigidities follows Faia (2009) and Sunakawa (2013), but di¤ers
from Barnichon (2010), Kuester (2010) and Thomas (2011), who adopt Calvo (1983) price
staggering. The price set by a rm determines the shadow value of the marginal worker, and
thus its hiring decision. In the Calvo setup, sticky-price rms choose a di¤erent employment
level than exible-price rms. This rm-specicity of labor alters the slope of the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve. For simplicity, we opt for the Rotemberg scheme, which delivers
the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve slope.9
2.5 Equilibrium
The government budget constraint equates current income (bond issues and tax revenues)
with current expenditure (government consumption, lump-sum transfers, and maturing gov-
ernment bonds),
Bt
RtPt
+  cCmt + 
fYt = Gt + Tt + (1  nt)T b + Bt 1
Pt
. (19)
The costs of posting vacancies and adjusting prices are passed on to households in the form
of lower dividends. Aggregate (after-tax) prots are
Dt =
 
1   fYt   wtnt   vvt   p
2
(t   1)2 Yt. (20)
Combining the aggregated household budget constraint with the government budget con-
straint (19) and the aggregate prot equation (20), we obtain the aggregate accounting
9In addition, the Rotemberg price setting scheme allows us to write down the model in non-linear form,
which we need to derive the Ramsey rst order conditions later in the paper.
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identity,
Yt + (1  nt) bc = Ct +Gt + vvt + p
2
(t   1)2 Yt. (21)
The model is closed with a description of monetary policy.
2.6 Model Summary
We condense the decision rules of households and rms into three equilibrium conditions
determining hours (ht), vacancies (vt) and real marginal costs (st),
st = {
hh
h
t (1 + 
c)Ct
'Ath
' 1
t
, (22)
v
M0 (
vt
1 nt )
   (1  ) Et
n
Ct
Ct+1
v
M0 (
vt+1
1 nt+1 )

o
(23)
= Et
n
Ct
Ct+1
[ v vt+11 nt+1   (1  ) bc + (1 
'
1+h
)At+1h
'
t+1st+1]
o
,
p (t   1)t + (1   f ) ("  1)  "st = pEt
n
Ct
Ct+1
(t+1   1)t+1At+1nt+1h
'
t+1
Atnth
'
t
o
. (24)
The technological constraints determining, respectively, the number of workers (nt+1) and
consumption (Ct) are given by the evolution of employment and the resource constraint,
nt+1 = (1  )nt +M0 (1  nt) v1 t , (25)
(1  p
2
(t   1)2)Atnth't + (1  nt) bc = Ct +Gt + vvt. (26)
Finally, monetary policy pins down a path for ination (t). We are now ready to provide
a formal denition of equilibrium.
Denition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a set of allocations fht; vt; nt+1; Ctg1t=0, prices
fstg1t=0, tax policies f f ;  c; T bg and monetary policy ftg1t=0, such that, given an initial
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employment level n0, households maximize utility, rms maximize prots, and all markets
clear.
2.7 Calibration
We calibrate the model parameters as follows.10 The discount factor in household prefer-
ences is set to  = 0:99, implying a steady-state annualized real interest rate of 4%. The
steady-state output level Y is normalized to unity. Steady-state technology is then set to
obtain an unemployment rate of 9:6% in the steady state, which corresponds to the aver-
age unemployment rate in the Euro Area between 1999 and 2013. The resulting value is
A = 1:30. Following Barnichon (2010), we set h, the curvature of labor disutility in hours,
equal to 2. The households weight on labor disutility h is calibrated such that hours equal
0:9 in steady state.11 Following Christo¤el et al. (2009), we set the probability of lling a
job, q, to 0:7, the job separation rate, , to 0:03 and the vacancy posting costs, v to 0:058.
From these parameters, we can deduce the probability of nding a job, p, equals 0:28, the
degree of labor market tightness, , equals 0:40 which both correspond to Christo¤el et al.s
(2009) calibration. The productivity in home production, b, is 0:74. We set the bargaining
power of workers, , to 0:4. The standard Hosios (1990) condition is satised, such that
the elasticity of matches to unemployment, , equals the bargaining power of workers. We
assume increasing returns to hours by setting ' = 1:5, as in Barnichon (2010).12 The sub-
stitution elasticity between intermediate goods is set to " = 6, yielding a net price markup
of 20%, and the price adjustment cost, p, is set to 20, as in Faia (2009) and Sunakawa
(2013). The share of government spending in total market output in steady state is roughly
one fth, G = 0:21 as measured in Euro Area data. In our benchmark calibration, tax rates
are set to zero,  f =  c = 0.
10The online appendix describes the models steady state which can be written recursively.
11This gives a value of h = 0:74.
12We impose this value such that, for our calibration of h and , the slope of the wage curve, { in (7),
is larger than one. Notice that setting  = 0:5 would yield an innite slope.
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3 Steady-State Distortions and Optimal Tax Policy
In this section, we rst derive the e¢ cient allocation. Second, we characterize the steady-
state distortions to employment and to the number of hours that arise in the competitive
equilibrium. Third, we derive the optimal tax policy mix that removes these distortions.
Finally, we analyze the e¤ects of the steady-state distortions on the model dynamics when
prices are exible.
3.1 E¢ cient Allocation
The social planner problem is to maximize household utility subject to the evolution of
aggregate employment, which we regard as a technological constraint, and the resource
constraint.
Denition 2 An e¢ cient allocation is a set of paths fht; vt; nt+1; Ctg1t=0 which maximizes
utility (1), subject to the employment dynamics constraint and the resource constraint,
nt+1 = (1  )nt +M0 (1  nt) v1 t , (27)
Atnth
'
t + (1  nt) b = Ct +Gt + vvt. (28)
The e¢ cient allocation is characterized by two conditions determining hours and employ-
ment. First, it can be shown that the e¢ cient hours choice satises
1 =
hh
h
t Ct
'Ath
' 1
t
. (29)
Equation (29) states that the utility cost of providing one additional hour of work must equal
its marginal benet captured by the marginal product of hours. Second, the e¢ cient choice
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of employment satises
v
M0 (
vt
1 nt )
   (1  ) Etf CtCt+1 vM0 (
vt+1
1 nt+1 )
g (30)
= Et
n
Ct
Ct+1
h
 v vt+11 nt+1   (1  ) b+ (1  ) (1 
'
1+h
)At+1h
'
t+1
io
.
The left hand side of (30) is the net hiring cost, while the right hand side is the e¢ cient
shadow value of a marginal worker.
3.2 Steady-State Distortions
We show that the competitive steady state is distorted by comparing the decentralized
decision rules concerning the choice of hours and employment with the respective e¢ ciency
conditions.
Hours Margin Comparing the hours choice in the competitive equilibrium (22) with the
e¢ ciency condition (29), we can state the following result.
Result 1 A distortion in the decentralized intensive labor margin arises if
s
{
6= 1 +  c. (31)
Following Galí et al. (2007), we characterize the distortion in the number of hours worked
in terms of a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of
hours. This wedge or ine¢ ciency gap is driven by a wage markup and a price markup,
representing ine¢ ciencies in labor markets and in product markets, respectively.
First, in the steady state, the real marginal wage (8) is related to the marginal rate of
substitution as follows
w0 (h) = wmrs, (32)
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where w = { can be viewed as a wage markup. In a typical calibration we have 1+h' > 1
and therefore { > 1, such that the real marginal wage under bargaining is larger than
the marginal rate of substitution. This means that wages rise faster with hours than in
the e¢ cient case. Recall that { = 1 if wages were set in a Walrasian labor market. The
parameter { thus captures the distortion imposed by the bargaining process.
Second, using the rms rst order condition for hours (14), we can relate the real marginal
wage to the marginal product of hours as follows,
w0 (h) =
mph
p
, (33)
where p = 1=s represents a price markup. Setting (32) and (33) equal to eliminate w
0 (h)
and dening the steady-state ine¢ ciency gap as gap = mrs
mph
, we obtain
gap = (wp)
 1 =
s
{
. (34)
In the absence of taxes ( f =  c = 0), Galí et al (2007)s ine¢ ciency gap (34) corresponds to
the hours distortion (31) in our model. More specically, we have gap = 1=({) < 1. The
ine¢ ciency in the choice of hours comes from two sources.
First, because of monopolistic competition in goods markets captured by the markup ,
which reduces real marginal costs below unity (s < 1), output and thus hours per worker
are too low.
Second, wages are not set as in a Walrasian labor market but are instead chosen through
bargaining. Suppose that wages are set such that the demand for hours by the rm equals
the supply of hours by the household. If the household could choose hours optimally, it
would set ht to maximize utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (3). The associated
rst order condition is that the real marginal wage equals the marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption, w0t (ht) = mrst.
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The wedge introduced by wage bargaining is greater than unity ({ > 1). For a given
product market distortion  > 1, it is theoretically possible that hours are e¢ cient (s={ = 1),
or even too high (s={ > 1). This is the case only if (1 + h) =' < 1 such that { < 1, which
happens if labor disutility does not rise strongly with hours, such that h is close to zero,
and there are strongly increasing returns to hours, such that ' is much above 1. We do not
consider this case here.
Figure 1 displays the (log) real marginal wage as a function of hours by using (32) and
(33), setting taxes to zero ( c =  f = 0). The competitive equilibrium allocation for hours
worked is at the intersection of the two curves. Notice that in this partial equilibrium exercise,
we plot the marginal rate of substitution (9) as a function of hours, keeping consumption
constant at the competitive level, C. Figure 1 also plots mrs and mph as a function of
hours worked. We keep consumption constant at the e¢ cient level, C, in mrs. The
e¢ cient number of hours worked can be read o¤ from the intersection of the two latter
curves.
The gure shows two results. First, hours worked are lower than in the e¢ cient alloca-
tion. This is what we call the hours distortion. Second, the real marginal wage is lower
than it would be in a Walrasian labor market. How do our results di¤er from Galí et al.
(2007)? First, since we consider two labor input margins, hours and employment, the hours
distortion in (34) is not the only ine¢ ciency. We analyze the employment distortion in more
detail below. Second, since in our model the marginal product of hours is increasing in
hours worked, the mph-curve is positively sloped in Figure 1. The real wage is therefore
unambiguously too low in the competitive equilibrium.
Trigari (2006) and Sunakawa (2013) show that the right-to-manage assumption, by
which rms choose hours unilaterally, results in a wedge between the marginal rate of sub-
stitution and the marginal product of labor. In an alternative setup where both wages and
hours are determined through Nash bargaining, this wedge is removed, such that hours are
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Figure 1: Labor Market Allocation: Hours
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Note: The curves depict the (log) real marginal wage, the (log) marginal product of labor and
the (log) marginal rate of substitution as a function of hours. The continuous line displays the
real marginal wage implied by the rms rst order condition for hours (33). The dashed line
displays the marginal product of hours (13). The line with circles displays the real marginal wage
determined through bargaining (32). The dotted line displays the marginal rate of substitution (9)
when  c = 0 and consumption is e¢ cient.
set e¢ ciently. This is what Trigari (2006) calls e¢ cient bargaining. She considers prede-
termined employment, but assumes a producer-retailer structure where price rigidities and
hiring frictions are located in di¤erent sectors. Sunakawa (2013) considers rms that face
both price rigidities and hiring frictions, but assumes instantaneous hiring. In our model,
both features are present: price rigidities and hiring frictions a¤ect the same rms and em-
ployment is predetermined. Therefore, we cannot use e¢ cient bargaining as a benchmark,
because a rm that has set a price needs to be able to adjust total hours in order to satisfy
demand at the chosen price. Since employment is predetermined, the only labor margin
adjustable in the short run is the number of hours per worker.
EmploymentMargin As in Pissarides (2000) and Krause and Lubik (2007b), we highlight
the distortions associated with vacancy posting decisions. To do so, we derive two steady-
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state equations in unemployment (u) and vacancies (v): the Beveridge Curve and the job
creation condition for both the competitive and the e¢ cient allocation.
Under symmetry, the law of motion for employment (4) is nt = (1  )nt 1+ qtvt, which
in steady state becomes n = qv= or
v =

(1  u)
M0u
 1
1 
u, (35)
after substituting out n and q. The Beveridge Curve (35) traces out the number of vacancies
v as a function of unemployment u, for a given matching e¢ ciencyM0 and separation rate
. Since the e¢ cient allocation is characterized by the same law of motion for employment
(4), the Beveridge Curve holds in the competitive and in the e¢ cient allocation.
The competitive job creation condition is derived by combining the vacancy posting
condition (15) with the shadow value (17) at the steady state. After several substitutions,
we obtain v
u

=
1



 v v
u
  (1  ) bc +

1  '
1 + h

s
Y
n

, (36)
where 
 = [1  (1  ) ]v= (M0). In the e¢ cient allocation, the steady-state job creation
condition is given by
v
u

=
1



 v v
u
  (1  ) b+

1  '
1 + h

(1  ) Y

n

. (37)
Comparing the job creation condition (36) with its e¢ cient counterpart (37), we can see that
there are three channels through which unemployment a¤ects the number of vacancies.
The rst channel is related to the e¤ect of unemployment on vacancy duration. This
is captured by the rst term on the right hand side of the job creation condition. For a
given matching e¢ ciencyM0, labor market tightness falls when unemployment rises, which
lowers the duration of a vacancy q 1 and encourages hiring. A distortion arises if  6= . To
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restore e¢ ciency, the well-known Hosios (1990) condition needs to hold, which requires that
the workersbargaining power  must equal the elasticity of vacancy duration to the number
of vacancies, . When this elasticity is high, a rm that posts a vacancy greatly increases
vacancy duration for all other rms, creating a congestion e¤ect. This e¤ect is o¤set if
workers have a lot of bargaining power, which discourages rms from posting vacancies. In
contrast to the standard search-and-matching model, however, the Hosios condition is not
enough to guarantee e¢ cient vacancy posting in this model.
The second channel is a deviation of the workers outside option bc from the e¢ cient
value b, which we recall represents the productivity in home production. A distortion arises
if bc 6= b. Any consumption tax or subsidy ( c 6= 0), distorts the choice of market production
relative to home production, and hence the workers outside option, since bc is no longer
equal to b in this case.13
The third channel is related to the combination of monopolistic competition and search
frictions in our large-rm setup. This is captured by the last term on the right hand side of
the job creation condition. A distortion arises if
s
Y
n
6= (1  ) Y

n
. (38)
The inequality captures two opposing e¤ects on hiring. First, because of the hours distortion
described above, output per worker is suboptimally low in the competitive equilibrium,
Y=n < Y =n. Since hours per worker are too low, an additional worker is less productive
and therefore less valuable to the rm, reducing the rms incentives to hire. Therefore,
employment is reduced below its e¢ cient level.
Second, in a typical calibration, steady-state real marginal costs are greater than the
elasticity of matches to vacancies, s > 1  . Recall that real marginal costs (14) represent
13This distortion is also present in the model of home production described by Ravenna and Walsh (2012).
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the cost of adjusting hours, relative to employment, in order to accommodate changes in
demand. Real marginal costs are high if w0 (h) is large, i.e. the wage curve is steep. In that
case, an additional worker and a corresponding reduction in the number of hours per worker
allows for a large wage cut for all other workers. This boosts the rms incentive to hire.
Intuitively, when the rm hires a new worker, its other workers have to work fewer hours
to produce a given amount of output. The bargained wage falls and this raises the shadow
value of a worker and hence the number of vacancies posted. Thus, rms have an incentive
to over-employ workers in order to reduce their bargaining position within the rm (see
Stole and Zwiebel, 1996). As shown by Ebell and Haefke (2009), this over-hiring externality
is reinforced when the degree of competition is low (the price markup  is high such that
s = 1= is close to 1). The following result summarizes this discussion.
Result 2 A distortion in the extensive labor margin arises when the shadow value of a
worker is too low or too high. Two forces work in opposite directions. On the one hand,
the monopolistic competition distortion depresses the number of hours per worker, h, and
therefore productivity (output per worker, Y/n),
Y
n
<

Y
n

, (39)
resulting in too low employment. On the other hand, if steady-state real marginal costs are
greater than the match elasticity to vacancies,
s > (1  ) , (40)
employment is too high in equilibrium.
Figure 2 depicts the Beverige curve, as well as the competitive and the e¢ cient job
creation condition (JCC).14 We keep the steady-state output levels in the competitive and
14Notice that the competitive Beveridge curve is identical to the e¢ cient one.
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in e¢ cient allocation, Y and Y  respectively, constant in this partial equilibrium exercise,
and we use the relation n = 1  u.
Figure 2: Labor Market Allocation: Employment
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Each curve depicts the number of vacancies as a function of the unemployment rate. The continuous
line displays the Beveridge Curve (35). The line with circles displays the competitive job creation
condition (36). The dashed line displays the e¢ cient job creation condition (37). The dotted line
displays the competitive job creation condition (36) when output is e¢ cient, Y = Y .
Under the standard Hosios condition  =  and with all tax rates set to zero ( f =
 c = T b = 0), the di¤erence between the competitive and e¢ cient JCC stems entirely from
the inequality (38). The Beveridge curve is the downward sloping curve in (u; v)-space. A
higher number of vacancies is associated with a higher level of employment (and hence lower
unemployment). The JCC is upward-sloping; as unemployment rises, the shadow value of
a worker rises overall and the number of vacancies increases. The equilibrium is located at
the intersection of the Beveridge curve with the relevant JCC.
The gure shows that the e¢ cient JCC is atter than the competitive JCC. The compet-
itive equilibrium is thus characterized by too much unemployment. What if hours are large
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enough such that output in the competitive economy is at the e¢ cient level? The corre-
sponding JCC is depicted as the steepest upward-sloping curve in Figure 2. The intersection
with the Beveridge Curve is at a point where unemployment is below the e¢ cient level. The
remaining distortion in the shadow value is given by the inequality s > 1  , leading to the
over-hiring distortion described above.
3.3 Optimal Tax Policy
Under exible prices, the e¢ cient allocation can be implemented through an appropriate tax
policy mix. More precisely, the policy maker needs to choose the scal instruments which
remove the hours and employment distortions at the steady state.
Denition 3 An optimal tax policy is a set { f ;  c; T b}, such that the zero-ination steady
state in the competitive equilibrium coincides with the e¢ cient steady state.
As described above, the intensive margin of labor is distorted when the ine¢ ciency gap
is not equal to the gross consumption tax, see (31). In addition, there are three potential
sources of distortion on the extensive margin of labor which can be shown by comparing
the decentralized JCC (36) with the e¢ cient JCC (37). In the following, we rst assume
that the standard Hosios condition is satised ( = ), which allows us to derive a simple
expression for an optimal mix of revenue taxes, consumption subsidies and transfers to the
unemployed, that jointly correct for ine¢ ciencies in vacancy posting and hours. Second, we
relax the Hosios assumption and derive the optimal tax policy mix for the general case.
Special Case We assume that the standard Hosios condition is satised ( = ). In
this special case, we can show analytically that the remaining distortions in hours and
employment can be removed with our tax instruments. To derive the optimal revenue and
consumption tax rates, we replace s =
 
1   f =, Y=n = Ah' and Y =n = Ah' in (31)
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and (38) to obtain:
1   f

h' = (1  )h', (41)
1   f
{
= 1 +  c. (42)
The optimal scal policy mix is given by the tax rates  f,  c and T b which jointly satisfy
the two e¢ ciency conditions (41) and (42), as well as b = bc, such that h = h and n = n.
Result 3 Under the standard Hosios condition  = , the optimal tax policy mix is given
by
1   f =  (1  ) , (43)
 c =   1 + h
'
, (44)
T b =   cb. (45)
First, we focus on the extensive labor margin as described in the rst e¢ ciency condition
(41). Given an optimal consumption tax such that hours worked are e¢ cient (h = h),
e¢ ciency in vacancy posting is restored with an appropriate revenue tax (43). The optimal
revenue tax depends on the price markup  and on the elasticity of matches to vacancies,
1   . Recall that the large-rm setup - in isolation - features an over-hiring externality
when condition (40) is satised. Firms employ too many workers in order to reduce hours
per worker and thus the wage bill through (6). Overhiring in turn generates congestion
e¤ects by reducing the probability of other rms to nd a worker. Therefore, the optimal
revenue tax to be imposed on a monopolistic rm equals the gross markup adjusted for the
congestion externalities it creates.15 Equation (43) shows that, if there are no matching
frictions and therefore no congestion externalities, such that  = 0, we have the standard
result from the New Keynesian model prescribing an optimal revenue subsidy equal to the
15Felbermayr et al. (2012) show that the over-hiring externality can also be corrected by increasing
unemployment benets.
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gross markup. If instead  (1  ) < 1, as is the case in a calibrated search-and-matching
model, rm revenues are instead taxed at the optimum,  f > 0.
Second, we turn to the intensive labor margin as described in the second e¢ ciency
condition (42). Given an optimal revenue tax such that employment is e¢ cient (n = n),
an appropriate consumption tax can correct the ine¢ ciency in hours worked, such that
h = h. Imposing  f =  f (43) in (42), the optimal consumption tax that removes the
hours distortion simplies to (44). The optimal consumption tax is negative: at the optimum,
market consumption should be subsidized. Recall that the hours distortion is driven by the
gap between the real marginal cost, s, and the slope of the wage curve, {, as shown in
(31). The latter corresponds to the deviation from Walrasian wage setting and is driven by
(1 + h) =' and , see (7). A high relative disutility cost of hours, (1 + h) =', or a high
worker bargaining power, , shift the real marginal wage curve up for any given number of
hours worked, see Figure 1. The farther the real marginal wage is from the marginal rate of
substitution, the greater is the required consumption subsidy, which shifts the marginal rate
of substution down, see (9).
Third, we choose an appropriate lump sum transfer to the unemployed such that we can
abstract from the choice between market and home production. To remove the distortionary
e¤ect of the consumption tax on vacancy posting, we allow for transfers to unemployed
workers T b =   cb, such that bc = b (see the denition of bc in the household budget
constraint (3)).
General Case In the general case where the standard Hosios condition does not hold
( 6= ), the optimal tax policy mix has no neat analytical form but instead depends on the
entire models steady state and therefore has to be derived numerically.16 We continue to
assume that unemployed workers receive lump-sum transfers T b, such that b = bc.
16First, the optimal revenue tax is such that employment in the competitive steady state equals its e¢ cient
level, n = n. Second, the optimal consumption tax removes the hours distortion by satisfying the e¢ ciency
condition (42).
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Figure 3 displays the optimal tax policy mix as a function of the elasticity of vacancy du-
ration to the number of vacancies, . The other model parameters are set to their benchmark
values, in particular, the workersbargaining power is set to  = 0:4.
Figure 3: Optimal Taxation and Congestion E¤ects
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The left panel shows the optimal tax on rm revenues, f, as a function of the elasticity of matches
to unemployment, . The right panel shows the optimal consumption tax,  c, as a function of .
For a given price markup, the higher the congestion e¤ects (large ), the larger is the
required tax on rm revenues. Large tax revenues lower steady-state real marginal costs s =
1 f

and hence the gap between s and 1 . At the same time, for a given bargaining friction
{, lowering steady-state real marginal costs s through (1   f ) increases the ine¢ ciency gap
{
s
, implying that consumption has to be subsidized by more. Therefore, the higher the
elasticity , the greater are both the optimal revenue tax and the optimal consumption
subsidy.
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3.4 E¤ect on Model Dynamics
We now analyze how the steady-state distortions a¤ect the variablesdynamics in a exible-
price model by comparing impulse responses in the competitive model with the e¢ cient ones.
Taxes are set to zero,  c =  f = T b = 0. Two shocks are considered, a technology shock (At)
and a government spending shock (Gt). The transmission channels of these shocks can be
better understood by examining the log-linearized equations driving the two labor margins.
In the competitive allocation, the hours and hiring decisions, (22) and (23), are given in
linearized form by:
s^t + A^t + ['  (1 + h)]h^t = C^t, (46)


^t =  r^t +$Ah
'
1=q
sEtfA^t+1 + 'h^t+1 + s^t+1g+ [(1  )    p]Etf^t+1g, (47)
where r^t =  Etf^t;t+1g is the real interest rate and we dene $  1 (1 ) v(1  '1+h ). A
exible-price version of our model is characterized by constant real marginal costs st = 1=,
such that s^t = 0. As emphasized by Monacelli et al. (2010), there are two channels at work
in hiring decisions.17 The rst is the real interest rate channel: any shock which increases
the real interest rate r^t, e.g. a public spending expansion, reduces the shadow value of an
additional worker and, in turn, discourages hiring. The second channel is the marginal value
of employment channel which is captured by the second term in (47): the marginal value of
a worker depends on his contribution to the wage bill through the reduction in hours per
worker.18
In the e¢ cient allocation, the hours and vacancy posting decisions (29) and (30) are given
in linearized form by:
A^t + ['  (1 + h)]h^t = C^t, (48)
17Since we do not consider investment in this model, the capital accumulation channel of Monacelli et al.
(2010) is absent here.
18We use a slightly di¤erent term than Monacelli et al. (2010), who call this the marginal value of work
channel, because in our model, there are two margins of work: employment and hours.
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
^t =  r^t +$Ah
'
1=q
(1  )EtfA^t+1 + 'h^t+1g+ [(1  )    p]Etf^t+1g. (49)
The hours decision is identical in the e¢ cient and in the decentralized allocation under exible
prices, see (46) and (48). Comparing the linearized hiring condition in the competitive
equilibrium (47) with its e¢ cient counterpart (49), we notice two di¤erences.
First, price stickiness induces ine¢ cient uctuations in employment through variations
in real marginal costs, s^t. Suppose that after an expansionary demand shock, prices do not
adjust upwards in the same proportion. Then real marginal costs rise. From (47), we see
that the shadow value of a worker rises, because it becomes more expensive to expand hours
in order to satisfy the higher demand. This e¤ect vanishes under exible prices where real
marginal costs are constant, s^t = 0.
Second, to the extent that Y=n
1=q
s di¤ers from Y
=n
1=q (1  ), there are ine¢ cient employment
uctuations even under exible prices, owing to the steady-state distortions explained above.
If the former elasticity, Y=n
1=q
s, is higher than its e¢ cient counterpart, Y
=n
1=q (1  ), hiring
responds too strongly to the marginal value of a worker and therefore to hours worked.
Under which conditions does the competitive allocation feature employment ine¢ ciencies?
As explained above, if distortions (31) and (38) are removed, the gap between the e¢ cient
and the competitive steady state disappears, which in turn makes the dynamics identical.
However, the bargaining process implies that there is a wedge between the real marginal cost
(s < 1) and the parameter reecting wage bargaining ({ > 1).
Figure 4 compares the impulse responses of output, hours and unemployment in response
to technology and government spending shocks in the competitive exible-price equilibrium
and in the e¢ cient allocation. Technology and government spending follow autoregressive
processes in logs,
A^t = (1  a) lnA+ aA^t 1 + "at , "at  N (0; a) , (50)
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G^t =
 
1  g

lnG+ gG^t 1 + "
g
t , "
g
t  N (0; g) , (51)
where A^t = ln(At=A) and G^t = ln(Gt=G). We calibrate a = g = 0:95 and a = g = 0:008,
as in Faia (2009). The model is the same as before, except that we replace the price setting
condition (18) with its exible-price counterpart, st = 1=.
Figure 4: Competitive and E¢ cient Dynamics
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
Output
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
Output
0 5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.2
0
Hours
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
Hours
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.02
0.04
Employment
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Employment
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 sh
oc
k
Sp
en
di
ng
 sh
oc
k
The left (right) panel shows the impulse response functions to a positive technology shock (govern-
ment spending shock, resp.). The continuous lines correspond to the dynamics in the competitive
allocation (in the absence of taxes and under exible prices, i.e. st = 1=). The dashed lines cor-
respond to the dynamics in the e¢ cient allocation. Employment is expressed in percentage-point
deviations from the steady state. Output and hours are in percent deviations from the steady state.
A government spending expansion (G^t) implies an increase in expected future taxes which,
through the wealth e¤ect, discourages household consumption and makes workers supply
more labor. Hours rise by more than is e¢ cient. This is because the steady-state real
marginal wage is too low, see Figure 1, such that a rise in hours raises the wage and therefore
rms production costs only by a small amount. Firms exploit this by expanding hours
worked by a large amount. As described above, the shadow value of a worker is too sensitive
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to hours worked in the competitive allocation, such that rms post too many vacancies and
employment rises too much in response to the spending expansion. Consequently, both the
extensive and the intensive margins are too volatile compared to the e¢ cient allocation.
An improvement in technology (A^t) implies that workers have to work fewer hours to
produce a given amount of output. The marginal value of a worker increases (driven by
A^t), although the rise in productivity is dampened by the reduction in hours. Figure 4
shows that hours drop by more in the competitive allocation than in the e¢ cient allocation.
This reduces the shadow value and hiring by rms relative to the e¢ cient case, see (47).
In addition, hiring responds by more to hours worked in the competitive allocation than
in the e¢ cient allocation. It follows that employment increases by less in the competitive
equilibrium than in the e¢ cient allocation.
We show in the next section that the gap between the e¢ cient and the competitive
allocation gives room for optimal deviations from price stability.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
In the following, we characterize optimal monetary policy when prices are sticky. To this
end, we compute the paths that the Ramsey policy maker chooses for the model variables in
order to maximize household utility, subject to the decision rules of households and rms.
A formal denition of the Ramsey policy is given next.
Denition 4 The Ramsey optimal policy is a set of plans for the control variables fht, vt,
nt+1, Ct, st, tg1t=0 that, for a given initial employment level n0, maximizes household utility
(1) subject to the implementability conditions (22)-(26).
Thomas (2008) shows that in the absence of wage markup uctuations, e.g. in the form
of nominal or real wage rigidities, strict ination targeting is optimal when the steady state
is e¢ cient. Since real marginal costs are the only time-varying wedges around an e¢ cient
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steady state, the optimal monetary policy stabilizes real marginal costs over the cycle. This is
true also in our model. Under the optimal tax policy ( f;  c; T b), price stability replicates
the e¢ cient allocation. However, if taxes are unavailable and the steady state is distorted,
price stability is no longer optimal.
We investigate how the optimal policy is a¤ected by steady-state distortions (31) and (38).
To this end, we derive the rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem and linearize them
around the steady state. First, we study the optimal dynamics in response to technology
shocks and government spending shocks. Second, we simulate the model under the Ramsey
policy and compute the optimal ination volatility.
The impulse response functions of ination, real wages, output, hours and employment,
under the optimal Ramsey policy and in the competitive allocation, are shown in Figure 5.
The left and the right panels show the responses to a technology shock and to a spending
shock, respectively.
The gure shows that under the optimal policy, ination is countercyclical with respect to
hours worked. After a spending expansion, real marginal costs (and therefore ination) need
to fall in order to compensate for the ine¢ ciently large rise in hours, see (47). In contrast,
a positive technology shock generates an ine¢ ciently large reduction in hours, which has to
be o¤set by a rise in ination. In the next paragraph, we show that the deviation from price
stability depends on the size of the two distortions. This nding di¤ers from Sunakawa (2013)
who shows that the Ramsey policy does not deviate from price stability in a search-and-
matching model with right-to-manage and instantaneous hiring. With instantaneous hiring,
a workers shadow value depends on his marginal productivity. Here, since employment is
predetermined, a workers shadow value depends instead on the reduction in hours and in
the wage paid to all other workers through the bargaining distortion (31). As shown above,
hours decrease too much in response to a technology shock at the cost of a small variation
in employment. This ine¢ ciency is corrected by modifying real marginal costs and therefore
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Figure 5: Competitive and Ramsey Optimal Policy Dynamics
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The left (right) panel shows the impulse response functions to a positive technology shock (gov-
ernment spending shock). The continuous lines correspond to the dynamics in a model without
taxes under the Taylor-type rule Rt=R = (t=)
1:5. The dashed lines correspond to the dynamics
in the Ramsey allocation. Annualized ination and employment is expressed in percentage-point
deviations from the steady state. All other responses are in percent deviations from the steady
state.
ination.
We now investigate in more detail what the main drivers of the optimal ination volatility
are. As shown in (31) and (38), the steady-state distortions are reected by two gaps. First,
the gap between real marginal costs s and the intra-rm bargaining parameter {. Second,
the gap between real marginal costs s and the elasticity of matches to vacancies, 1  . We
rst consider the optimal ination volatility as a function of s.19 In practice, we compute
the volatility for a grid of values for ", the elasticity of substitution between goods varieties.
The real marginal cost is s = ("  1) =". Consider Figure 6.
19The volatility is given by the standard deviation of annualized ination under the Ramsey policy.
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Figure 6: Optimal Ination Volatility
1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2 2.1
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
In
fl
at
io
n 
V
ol
at
il
it
y
0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
In
fl
at
io
n 
V
ol
at
il
it
y
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
In
fl
at
io
n 
V
ol
at
il
it
y
The optimal ination volatility is computed as the standard deviation of annualized ination (in
percent). The upper panel displays ination volatility as a function of the real marginal cost, s. The
middle panel displays ination volatility as a function of the net disutility cost of hours, (1 + h)='.
The lower panel displays ination volatility as a function of the workersbargaining power, .
The upper panel in Figure 6 shows that optimal ination volatility is 0:18% in our
benchmark calibration.20 A high volatility goes hand in hand with low real marginal costs
(i.e. a high price markup, ). All things equal, higher real marginal costs diminish the steady-
state hours distortion as s gets closer to {, see (34).21 At the same time, the steady-state
employment distortion is worsened as s deviates more from 1 , see (40). The deviation from
price stability therefore depends on the relative size of these two distortions. We can shut
down the hours distortion by imposing an optimal consumption subsidy  c =  c. Since the
only distortion left is the employment distortion, we nd that volatility of optimal ination
is reduced to 0:09% (not shown).
We now have a closer look at the hours distortion, given by (31), which depends on
the gap between the real marginal cost, s, and the intra-rm bargaining parameter, {. As
mentioned above, a large value of { implies that the wage curve is steep in hours, see (8).
20The relative ination volatility (=y) is 0.10.
21To understand this result, recall that in our benchmark calibration. s = 0:83, { = 3 and 1   = 0:6.
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It follows from distortion (31) that the ine¢ ciency gap is large since the level of hours is
too low compared to the Walrasian labor market allocation (i.e. { = 1). To conrm this
intuition, the middle and lower panels in Figure 6 display the volatility of optimal ination
as a function of (1 + h)=' and , respectively, the two drivers of the intra-rm bargaining
parameter {.22 Recall that { is a positive function of (1 + h)='. If the disutility cost of
hours is high compared to the returns to hours in production, we are further away from a
Walrasian labor market and the steady-state distortion resulting from bargaining is larger.
Similarly, parameter { is a positive function of the workersbargaining power . Intuitively,
real wages in steady state deviate more from the Walrasian allocation when workers have
greater bargaining power. From Figure 1 we see that the real marginal wage is too low, such
that wages respond less to hours. Firms exploit this insensitivity of wages by overusing the
hours margin in response to shocks, at the expense of the employment margin. Hours become
too volatile over the business cycle. This in turn generates optimal ination volatility. The
deviation from price stability depends on parameters a¤ecting the trade-o¤ between the
intensive and the extensive margins of labor: the larger is the deviation from Walrasian
wage setting, {, the greater is the optimal deviation from price stability.
This result di¤ers from Sunakawa (2013) who shows that, in the absence of real wage
rigidities, price stability is optimal in a right-to-manage model with instantaneous hiring.
The reason is that in that setup, real wages and hours replicate the Walrasian allocation.
We show that the intra-rm bargaining process combined with predetermined employment
generates optimal deviations from price stability by generating hours and real wages that
di¤er from the Walrasian allocation.
22In practical terms, we vary ', taking (1 + h) as given.
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5 Conclusion
We study optimal policy in New Keynesian search-and-matching model where rms can
adjust their workforce as well as hours per worker. Firms operate under monopolistic com-
petition; they set a price and commit to satisfying demand at that price. Since employment
is predetermined, rms adjust hours per worker in a right-to-managefashion in order to
satisfy demand in the short run. The right-to-manage assumption, combined with wage bar-
gaining, results in a convex wage curve, such that the real marginal wage is an increasing
function of hours per worker. In a large-rm model, this wage curve generates an external-
ity since a change in the number of hours per worker a¤ects the wage of all other workers.
We show that product market imperfections and labor market frictions combine to reduce
steady-state output and hours below their e¢ cient levels. Since the real marginal wage is too
low at the steady state, wages respond little to hours worked. Firms exploit this real wage
rigidity by overusing the hours margin when adjusting their production level in response
to shocks. As a result, hours are too volatile along the business cycle. A policy of strict
ination targeting is suboptimal in this environment. Ination can be used to a¤ect the real
wage set through bargaining and dampen ine¢ cient uctuations in hours.
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